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Abstract
A database-assisted TV white space network can achieve the goal of green cognitive communication by
effectively reducing the energy consumption in cognitive communications. The success of such a novel network
relies on a proper business model that provides substantial incentives for all parties involved. In this paper, we
propose an integrated spectrum and information market for a database-assisted TV white space network, where
the geo-location database acts as an online platform providing services to both spectrum market and information
market. We model the interactions among the database operator, the spectrum licensee, and unlicensed users as
a three-stage sequential decision process. Specifically, Stage I characterizes the negotiation between the database
and the licensee, in terms of the commission for the licensee to use the spectrum market platform, Stage II models
the pricing decisions of the database and the licensee, and Stage III characterizes the subscription behaviors of
unlicensed users. Analyzing such a three-stage model is challenging due to the co-existence of both positive and
negative network externalities in the information market. Nevertheless of this, we are able to explicitly characterize
the impact of network externalities on the equilibrium behaviors of all parties involved. We analytically show that
the licensee can never get a market share larger than half in the integrated market. Our numerical results further
show that the proposed integrated market can outperform a pure information market in terms of network profit up
to 87%.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
With the explosive growth of mobile smartphones and bandwidth-hungry wireless applications, the
corresponding energy consumption due to telecommunication industry is increasing at a unprecedented
speed of 16% − 20% per annum [2]. Moreover, according to the Climate Group SMART 2020 Report
[3], the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures account for 3% of global energy
consumption and 2% of global CO2 emissions. Hence, energy optimization of wireless communications,
ranging from equipment manufacturing to core functionalities, becomes increasingly important for pro-
tecting our environment, coping with global warming, and facilitating sustainable development.
Yuan Luo, Lin Gao, and Jianwei Huang (corresponding author) are with Network Communications and Economics Lab (NCEL), Department
of Information Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, HK, E-mail: {yluo, lgao, jwhuang}@ie.cuhk.edu.hk.
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2Cognitive communication has been viewed as a promising paradigm for achieving energy-efficient
communications. The key idea is to allow the cognitive radio device to adapt its configuration and
transmission decision to the real-time radio environment. Hence, a cognitive radio device can select the best
reconfiguration operation that balances the energy consumption and communication quality. Obviously, the
success of cognitive communication system greatly relies on the accurate detection of radio environment
(e.g., locating the idle channels and figuring out the allowable transmission power to minimize interference
to existing users). If a mobile device is fully responsible for the continuous and accurate detection of
radio environment, it would consume a significant amount of energy. The higher accuracy, the higher
computational burden on a mobile device, and thus the higher energy consumption.
In order to reduce energy consumption and guarantee the performance of cognitive communication, some
spectrum regulators (such as FCC in the USA and Ofcom in the UK), together with standards bodies and
industrial organizations,1 have advocated a database-assisted TV white space network architecture. In such
a network, a white space database (called geo-location database) assists unlicensed wireless devices (called
white space devices, WSDs) opportunistically exploit the under-utilized UHF/VHF frequency band, which
is originally assigned for broadcast television services (hereafter called TV channels) [4], [5]. The main
reason for choosing the UHF/VHF frequency band to support cognitive communications is two-fold. First,
this band is largely under-utilized by the TV broadcast services. Second, this low-frequency band can sup-
port long-distance wireless communications with low transmission power (hence low energy consumption),
comparing with the current spectrum band used by cellular and WiFi networks.
In such a database-assisted network, the geo-location database houses a global repository of TV
licensees, and updates the licensees’ channel occupations periodically. Each WSD obtains the available
TV channel information via querying a geo-location database (via some existing communication networks
such as cellular or Wi-Fi networks), rather than having to directly sense the TV channels which lead to
significant energy consumption. In other words, WSDs are mainly responsible for performing the necessary
local computations (e.g., identifying their current locations), and databases are responsible for performing
intensive data processing (e.g., computing the available TV channels for each WSD based on the channel
availabilities and WSD location information). Such a network architecture can effectively reduce the
overall energy consumptions and lead to a green communication ecosystem.
According to existing related regulations, the geo-location databases are operated by third-party com-
panies (instead of directly by the regulators or TV license owners). These database operators such as
SpectrumBridge, Microsoft, and Google need to cover its capital expense (CapEx) and operating expense
1 Example include IEEE 802.22 WRAN standard (http://www.ieee802.org/22/) and the industrial companies such as Google (http://www.
google.org/spectrum/whitespace/), Microsoft (http://whitespaces.msresearch.us/), and Spectrum Bridge (http://www.spectrumbridge.com/).
3(OpEx) through a properly designed business model. Existing models related to the database-assisted
network can be categorized into two classes: Spectrum Market and Information Market.
The spectrum market (e.g., [6]–[8]) focuses on the trading of licensed TV channels, which are registered
to some TV licensees but are under-utilized by the licensees. Hence, the licensees can temporarily lease
the under-utilized (licensed) TV channels to WSDs which are able to enjoy an exclusive usage right
during a short time period. This will generate some additional revenue for the licensees. The database
serves as a market platform facilitating such a spectrum market.2 Spectrum Bridge, the world first certified
geo-location database, provides such a database-provided spectrum market platform called SpecEx [9].
The information market has been modeled and analyzed for the unlicensed TV channels (i.e., TV white
spaces) in our early work [10], [11]. The unlicensed TV channels are those not registered to any TV
licensee at a particular location (for example, outside the official coverage range of the TV towers), hence
are the public resources at that location. The spectrum regulators can assign the unlicensed TV channels
for the public and shared usage among unlicensed WSDs, and usually do not allow direct trading of such
channels in a spectrum market. As these channels will be used by WSDs in a shared manner (in contrast to
the exclusive usage in the spectrum market), the communication quality in these unlicensed TV channels is
usually not guaranteed. Notice that the database knows more advanced information regarding the quality of
unlicensed TV channels than unlicensed users.3 Hence, it can sell this information to the unlicensed users
through an information market, which not only improves the unlicensed users’ expected communication
quality, but also provides additional profit to the database. A commercial example of information market
is White Space Plus [12], again operated by Spectrum Bridge.
All of above listed works considered the spectrum market and information market separately and
independently. In practice, however, the licensed TV channels and unlicensed TV channels often co-
exist at a particular location. Some users may prefer to lease the licensed TV channels for the exclusive
usage, while other users may prefer to share the free unlicensed TV channels with others (and purchase
advanced information if needed). Hence, a joint formulation and optimization of both spectrum market and
information market is important for the practical large scale deployment of the database-based TV white
space network. However, none of the existing work on economics of TV white space networks [6]–[8]
looked at the interaction between spectrum market and information market. This motivates our study of
an integrated spectrum and information market for such a database-assisted TV white space network.
2For example, it can act as a spectrum broker or agent, purchase spectrum from licensees and then resell the purchased spectrum to
unlicensed users.
3For example, based on the knowledge about the network infrastructures of TV licensees and their licensed channels, the database can
predict the average interference (from licensed devices) on each TV channel at each location.
4Fig. 1. Illustration of database-provided integrated spectrum and information market. Users 1 and 2 lease the licensed TV channels from the
spectrum market, and users 3 and 4 share the free unlicensed TV channels with others. User 4 further purchases the advanced information
from the information market to improve its performance.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we model and study an integrated spectrum and information market for a database-assisted
TV white space network, in which the geo-location database serves as (i) a spectrum market platform for
the trading of (under-utilized) licensed TV channels between spectrum licensees and unlicensed users4, and
(ii) an information market platform for the trading of information (regarding the unlicensed TV channels)
between the database itself and unlicensed users. Unlicensed users can choose to lease the licensed TV
channels from licensees (via the database) for the exclusive usage, or to share the free unlicensed TV chan-
nels with others and purchase the advanced information from the information market if needed. Figure 1
illustrates such an integrated market.
To understand the market dynamics and equilibrium behaviors in such an integrated market, we for-
mulate the interactions among the geo-location database (operator), the spectrum licensee, and unlicensed
users as a three-stage hierarchical model:
1) Stage I: Commission Negotiation (Section VI): In Stage I, the database and the spectrum licensee
negotiate regarding the commission for the licensee to use the spectrum market platform. Specifically,
the database provides a platform facilitating the under-utilized licensed TV channels trading between the
licensee and unlicensed users. Such a database-assisted licensed spectrum leasing has been widely adopted
in the current Licensed Shared Access (LSA) and Authorized Shared Access (ASA) system. In return, the
database takes some commission charge from each successful transaction between the spectrum licensee
and unlicensed users. We consider two different commission charging schemes: (i) revenue sharing scheme
(RSS), where the licensee shares a fixed percentage of revenue with the database, and (ii) wholesale pricing
4For convenience, we will call “white space devices” as “unlicensed users” in this paper.
5scheme (WPS), where the database charges a fixed wholesale price from each successful transaction of
the licensee. We assume that both the database and spectrum licensee have market powers, and study the
equilibrium commission charge decisions under both schemes using the Nash bargaining theory [13].
2) Stage II: Price Competition Game (Section V): In Stage II, the database and the spectrum licensee
compete with each other for selling information or channels to unlicensed users. The spectrum licensee
decides the price of the licensed TV channels, and the database decides the price of the advanced
information (regarding the unlicensed TV channels). We analyze such a price competition game, and
show that it is a supermodular game [14] with nice properties.
3) Stage III: User Behavior and Market Dynamics (Section IV): In Stage III, unlicensed users decide the
best subscription decisions, given the database’s information price and the licensee’s spectrum price. Note
that the users need to consider both negative network externality (due to congestion and interference) and
positive network externality (due to the quality of information provided by the database) of the information
market. We will show how the market dynamically evolves based on users’ choices, and what the market
equilibrium point is.
In our model, Stage I and Stage II focus on cooperation and competition, respectively. In Stage I,
we study the bargaining process between the database and the licensee, and analyze how they reach an
collaborative agreement on the leasing service. In Stage II, we study the pricing strategies of the database
and the licensee who target at different user groups. The licensee targets at those users who choose
the licensed channels for the exclusive usage, while the database targets at those users who choose the
unlicensed channels. The goal of the cooperation is to make the pie larger, and the goal of competition
is to decide the way to divide the pie [15].
The timescales of three stages are as follows.
• The bargaining in Stage I is performed at a large time scale, e.g., once every year;
• The price competition in Stage II occurs at a medium time scale, e.g., once every month;
• The user subscription in Stage III changes at a small time scale, e.g., once every day.
This three-stage hierarchical order of decision making can be explained as follows. In Stage I, the
licensee and the database would not frequently re-negotiate the new terms, as it would consume time
and resources to reach an new agreement and change the resource based on the new agreement. They
will only negotiate again when the network resources or network infrastructure change. In Stage II, the
achieved price equilibrium depends on the database’s and the licensee’s costs for providing the advanced
service or leasing service to users. In practice, these costs will not change frequently (e.g., change per
one month), and neither will the price equilibrium. In Stage III, a user’s subscription decision depends on
his instantaneous preference for data rate (i.e., the user’s type θ in our model). We divide the whole time
6period into multiple frames, each lasting for certain time (e.g., one day), and assume that the distribution
of users’ preference remains the same across different time frames.
We summarize the main contributions as follows.
• Novelty and Practical Significance: We propose and study the first integrated spectrum and in-
formation market in the literature, for promoting the unlicensed spectrum access to both licensed
and unlicensed TV channels. The proposed model captures both the positive and negative network
externaltiy of the TV white space network.
• Market Equilibrium Analysis: We characterize the sufficient condition under which the proposed
integrated market has a unique (user subscription) market equilibrium. We prove that the unique
equilibrium is stable, in the sense that a small fluctuation on the equilibrium will drive the market
back to the equilibrium.
• Competition Between the Database and the Licensee: We study the price competition between the
database and the licensee and prove the existence and uniqueness of the price equilibrium. Key
contributions of our analysis involves the transformation of the price competition game into an
equivalent market share competition game, and the demonstration of the existence and uniqueness of
the equilibrium of the transformed game using supermodular game theory.
• Nash Bargaining on the Commission Charge: We adopt the Nash bargaining framework to achieve
a fair and Pareto-efficient commission charge between the database and the licensee, under both
revenue sharing scheme (RSS) and wholesale pricing scheme (WPS).
• Observations and Insights: We show that in this integrated spectrum and information market, the
market share equilibrium of the licensee is always no more than half. In terms of the network profit,
our proposed integrated market scheme can improve up to 87% comparing with a pure information
market, and the gap with the coordinated benchmark is less than 10%. When further comparing
our two proposed commission charging schemes, we show that the revenue sharing scheme (RSS)
always outperforms wholesale pricing scheme (WPS) in terms of social welfare maximization. In
terms of maximizing database’s and licensee’s own profit, the result will depend on the level of
network externality. When the negative network externality is dominant, RSS is a better choice for
the database, while WPS is a better choice fort the licensee. When the positive network externality
is dominant, WPS is a better choice for both the database and the licensee.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the related literature. In Section
III, we present the system model. In Sections IV-VI, we analyze the market equilibrium in Stage III, the
price competition game game in Stage II, and the commission bargaining solution in Stage I, respectively.
In Section VII, we provide the simulation results. Finally, we conclude in Section VIII.
7II. RELATED WORK
Most of the existing studies on green cognitive communications aimed at addressing the technical issues.
For example, Hafeez and Elmirghani in [16] presented a new licensed shared access spectrum sharing
scheme to increase the energy efficiency in a network. Palicot in [17] demonstrated how to achieve green
radio communications by employing cognitive radio technology. Ji et al. in [18] proposed a platform to
explore TV white space in order to achieve green communications in cognitive radio network. Successful
commercialization of new green cognitive technology, however, not only relies on sound engineering, but
also depends on the proper design of a business model that provides sufficient incentives to the involved
parties such as spectrum licensees and the network operators. The joint study of technology and business
issues is relatively under explored in the current green cognitive radio literature.
A common approach for studying market price competition is to model and analyze it as a non-
cooperative game. For example, Niyato et al. in [20] proposed an iterative algorithm to achieve the Nash
equilibrium in the competitive spectrum trading market. Min et al. in [21] studied two wireless service
providers’ pricing competition by considering spectrum heterogeneity. Zhu et al. in [22] studied pricing
competition among macrocell service providers via a two-stage multi-leader-follow game. In the above
literature, the market is assumed to be associated with the negative network externality or non-externality.
Luo et al. in [11] studied the price competition in the information market of TV white space, where the
information market is only associated with the positive network externality. In our work, the integrated
market is associated with both the positive and negative network externality. Our numerical results show
that the database benefits from the positive network externality, while the licensee benefits from the
negative network externality. Furthermore, which commission charging scheme is better for the database
or the licensee depends on what kind of network externality is dominant in the network. This makes our
market analysis quite different with the above works.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a database-assisted TV white space network, with a geo-location database (or database
for short) and a set of unlicensed users (or users for short). There exist some unlicensed TV channels,
which can be used by unlicensed users freely in a shared manner (e.g., using CDMA). Meanwhile, there
is a spectrum licensee, who owns some licensed channels and wants to lease the under-utilized channels
to users for additional revenue.5 Different from the unlicensed TV channels, the licensed TV channels
can be used by users in an exclusive manner (with the permission of the licensee). Therefore, users can
enjoy a better performance (e.g., a higher data rate or a lower interference) on the licensed TV channels.
5In case there are multiple spectrum licensees, we assume that they are coordinated by the single representative. We will study the more
general issue of licensee competition in the future work.
8A. Services Offered by the Database
Motivated by the current regulatory practices and commercial examples [5], [9], [12], we assume that
the database provides the following three services to the users.
1) Basic Service: Regulators such as Ofcom in UK and FCC in US require a database to provide an
unlicensed user with the following information [4], [5]: (i) the list of unlicensed TV channels, and (ii)
each channel’s transmission constraints such as a user’s maximum allowable transmission power. Any
user can have this basic (information) service for free.
2) Advanced Service: Beyond the basic information, the database can also provide certain advanced
information regarding the quality of TV channels (as SpectrumBridge did in [12]), as long as it does not
conflict with the free basic service. pWe refer to such additional service as the advanced (information)
service. Appendix A illustrates an example of the advanced information in terms of the interference level
on each channel. With the advanced information, the user is able to choose a channel with the highest
quality (e.g., with the lowest interference level). Hence, the database can sell this advanced information
to users for profit. This leads to an information market.
3) Leasing Service: As mentioned previously, the database can also serve as a spectrum market platform
for the trading of licensed channels between the spectrum licensee and users, which we call the leasing
service (as SpectrumBridge did in [9]). In return, the database will charge commission to the spectrum
licensee when a trading happens. Through using the database as the trading platform, the licensees received
the aggregation benefit [23], comparing with the case that they try to directly reach leasing agreement
with users. Specifically, due to the database’s proximity to both spectrum licensees and the users, the
database’s spectrum market platform can aggregate users demand and licensees spectrum, provide trust
between participants, and match users and licensees. Hence, the licensees can save time and market efforts
in identifying the potential buyers. We consider two different commission charging schemes: (i) revenue
sharing scheme (RSS), where the licensee shares a fixed percentage of revenue with the database, and (ii)
wholesale pricing scheme (WPS), where the database charges a fixed wholesale price from each successful
transaction, regardless of the licensee’s revenue from that transaction.6
B. A User’s Choices
Users can choose either to purchase the licensed channel from the licensee for the exclusive usage, or
to share the unlicensed TV channels with others (with and without advanced information). We assume
that all licensed and unlicensed TV channels have the same bandwidth (e.g., 8MHz in UK), and each user
only needs one channel (either licensed or unlicensed) at a particular time.
6Both commission charging schemes are widely used in practice. The revenue sharing scheme is widely used in retail markets such as
[24]–[26]. The wholesale pricing scheme is widely used in many newsvendor models such as [20], [27], [28].
9Formally, we denote s ∈ {b,a, l} as the strategy of a user, where
(i) s = b: Choose the basic service (i.e., share unlicensed channels with others, without the advanced
information);
(ii) s = a: Choose the advanced service (i.e., share unlicensed channels with others, with the advanced
information).
(iii) s = l: Choose the leasing service (i.e., lease the licensed channel for the exclusive usage).
We further denote B(ηL), A(ηA, ηL), and L as the expected utilities that a user can achieve from choosing
the basic service (s = b), the advanced service (s = a), and the leasing service (s = l), respectively.
Here, ηB, ηA, and ηL denote the fractions of users choosing the basic service, the advanced service, and
the leasing service, respectively. For convenience, we refer to ηB, ηA, and ηL as the market shares of
the basic service, the advanced service, and the leasing service, respectively. Obviously, ηB, ηA, ηL ≥ 0
and ηB + ηA + ηL = 1. As explained in Section III-C, the values of B(ηL) and A(ηA, ηL) depend on all
users’ choices, while the value of L is independent of market share. The payoff of a user is defined as
the difference between the achieved utility and the cost (i.e., the information price when choosing the
advanced service, or the leasing price if choosing the leasing service). Let θ denote the user’s evaluation
for the achieved utility7, piL ≥ 0 denote the leasing price of the licensee, and piA ≥ 0 denote the (advanced)
information price of the database. Then, the payoff of a user with an evaluation factor θ is
ΠEUθ =

θ ·B(ηL), if s = b,
θ · A(ηA, ηL)− piA, if s = a,
θ · L− piL, if s = l.
(1)
A rational user will choose a strategy s ∈ {b,a, l} to maximize its payoff. Note that users are
heterogeneous in terms of θ, which characterizes how different users evaluate the same data rate. For
example, for a user who wants to send a plain text email, his evaluation for a small data rate may be
similar to that for a high data rate, as a small data rate is enough for finish sending the email. This can be
captured by a small θ. On the other hand, if the email contains a large attachment and needs to be sent
within a short amount of time (such as tens of seconds), then the user has a much higher valuation for
a high data rate and hence a large θ. Similarly, for a user who is watching a high-quality online video,
his evaluation for a small data rate may be much lower than that for a high data rate. This can also be
captured by a large θ.
Let cA denote the energy consumption cost of the database for providing the advance service, and let
cL denote the energy consumption cost of the licensee for providing the leasing service. For the rest of
the paper, we will also use ”operational cost” to refer to these costs.
7We consider a simplified but rather general model, where the QoS of a user is a linear function of the expected data rate.
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We further denote δ ∈ [0, 1] as the revenue sharing percentage under RSS, and w ≥ 0 as the wholesale
price under WPS. We assume a unit population of agents., (i.e., the total number of users is equal to 1).
Then, the payoffs (profits) of the spectrum licensee ΠSL and the database ΠDB, which are defined as the
difference between the revenue obtained by providing the services and the cost, are given as follow. The
payoffs under the RSS scheme (Scheme I) are Π
SL , ΠSL(I) = (piL − cL)ηL(1− δ)
ΠDB , ΠDB(I) = (piA − cA)ηA + (piL − cL)ηLδ,
(2)
and under the WPS scheme (Scheme II) are Π
SL , ΠSL(II) = (piL − w)ηL − cLηL,
ΠDB , ΠDB(II) = piAηA + wηL − cAηA.
(3)
C. Positive and Negative Network Externalities
Network externalities arise when a user’s experiencing of consuming a service/product depends on the
behavior of other users in the same network [23]. In the integrated market that we study, there coexist
two types of network externalities. The negative network externality characterizes the user performance
degradation due to an increased level of congestion. The positive network externality corresponds to
the increasing quality of the (advanced) information as more users purchase the information. Next we
analytically quantify these two network externalities. As ηA + ηB + ηL = 1, sometimes we also denote the
total fraction of users using unlicensed TV channels as 1− ηL in the rest of the paper.
We first have the following observations for a user’s expected utility of three strategy choices:
• L is a constant independent of ηA, ηB, and ηL. This is because a user can access to the licensed
channel exclusively, hence the communication performance on such a channel does not depend on
the choices of others.
• B is non-increasing in 1− ηL (the total fraction of users using unlicensed TV channels) due to the
congestion effect. This is because the unlicensed TV channels must be used in a shared manner,
hence more users using these channels increases the level of congestion (interference) and reduces
the performance of each user. We denote the congestion effect caused by users using the same
unlicensed TV channels as negative network externality.
• A is non-increasing in 1 − ηL, due to the negative network externality. This is because the unli-
censed TV channels are shared by users, independent of their choices of subscribing to the database’s
advanced service or not.
• A is non-decreasing in ηA. As more users subscribe to the database’s advanced service, the more
information (e.g., users channel choices and transmission power levels) the database knows. In such
11
case, the database can estimate more accurate channel information, which benefits the users who
subscribe to the advanced service. More detailed explanation is provided in Appendix A. Such benefit
that increases with the users choosing the advanced service is called the positive network externality.
We write B as a non-increasing function of 1− ηL, i.e.,
B(ηL) , f(1− ηL). (4)
We write A as the combination of a non-increasing function of 1 − ηL and a non-decreasing function
of ηA, i.e.,
A(ηA, ηL) , f(1− ηL) + g(ηA). (5)
Function f(·) reflects the congestion effect, and is identical for B and A (as users experience the same
congestion effect in both basic and advanced services). Function g(·) reflects the performance gain induced
by the advanced information, i.e., the (advanced) information value.
We have the following natural assumption:
Assumption 1. The expected utilities achieved by choosing different services satisfy
L > A(ηA, ηL) > B(ηL).
Comparing with unlicensed TV channels, there is no congestion on the licensed TV channels. Hence,
the expected utility provided by the leasing service is larger than that provided by the advanced service
(i.e., L > A(ηA, ηL) and L > B(ηL)). As advanced information provides benefit to the users, we have
A(ηA, ηL) > B(ηL). 8
We further introduce the following assumptions on functions f(·) and g(·).
Assumption 2. Function f(·) is non-negative, non-increasing, convex, and continuously differentiable.
Assumption 3. Function g(·) is non-negative, non-decreasing, concave, and continuously differentiable.
Due to the increasing marginal performance degradation under congestion, we assume that function f(·)
is non-increasing and convex. Such assumption is widely used to model the network congestion effect
in wireless networks (see, e.g., [29], [30] and references therein). Because of the diminishing marginal
performance improvement induced by the advanced information, we assume that function g(·) is non-
decreasing and concave. Note that the above generic functions f(·) and g(·) can potentially model a wide
8If we set L < B(ηL), no one will choose the leasing service even the leasing service is free of charge. In this case, our integrated model
degenerates to the pure information market that is analyzed in [10]. If we set A(ηA, ηL) = B(ηL), then no user will choose the advanced
service even the database provides the advanced service for free. In this case, our integrated model degenerates to a simpler market, where
the licensee provides the leasing service and the database provides the basic service only. The analysis of such a model is simpler than the
most general case that we consider here.
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Stage I: Commission Negotiation
The database and the spectrum licensee negotiate the commission charge
details (i.e., δ under RSS or w under WPS).
⇓
Stage II: Price Competition Game
The database determines the information price piA;
The spectrum licensee determines the channel price piL.
⇓
Stage III: User Behavior and Market Dynamics
The users determine and update their choices according to best responses;
The market evolves to an equilibrium point.
Fig. 2. Three-stage Interaction Model
range of scenarios where advanced information has different meanings. We will provide more detailed
discussions in the Appendix A.
D. Three-Stage Interaction Model
Based on the above discussion, an integrated spectrum and information market involves the interactions
among the database, the spectrum licensee, and the users. Hence, we formulate the interactions as a
three-stage hierarchical model as shown in Figure 2.
Specifically, Stage I captures the negotiation process between the database and the spectrum licensee,
who negotiate the commission charge details of the spectrum market platform, i.e., the revenue sharing
factor δ under RSS, or the wholesale price w under WPS. Stage II studies the price competition between
the database and the spectrum licensee, where the database determines the advanced information price
piA, and the spectrum licensee determines the leasing licensed channel price piL. Stage III focuses on the
subscription behaviors of users, where each user makes his best choice, and dynamically updates the
subscription choice based on the current market shares.
In the following sections, we will use backward induction to analyze this three-stage interaction model.
IV. STAGE III – USER BEHAVIOR AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study the user behavior and market dynamics in Stage III, given the database’s
information price piA and the licensee’s channel price piL (in Stage II). In the following, we first discuss
the user’s best response choice, then show how the user behavior dynamically evolves, finally discuss
how the market converges to an equilibrium point.
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A. User’s Best Response
Equations (1), (4) and (5) show that users’ choices of services depend on the current market shares of
different services. Hence given the market shares, users can compute their best response choices, which
in turn will affect the market shares. Next we will characterize such a process in details.
For convenience, we introduce a virtual time-discrete system with slots t = 1, 2, . . ., where users change
their decisions at the beginning of every slot, based on the market shares at the end of the previous time
slot. 9 Let (ηtL, η
t
A, η
t
B) denote the market shares at the end of slot t satisfying (η
t
L, η
t
A) ∈ Ω, where Ω is
the market share feasible set defined as Ω = {(ηL, ηA) ∈ R2+|ηL + ηA ≤ 1}. For convenience, we assume
that θ is uniformly distributed in [0, 1] for all users.10 As each user will choose a strategy that maximizes
its payoff defined in (1), a type-θ user’s best response is
s∗θ = l, iff θ · L− piL > max{θ · A(ηtA, ηtL)− piA, θ ·B(ηtL)},
s∗θ = a, iff θ · A(ηtA, ηtL)− piA > max{θ · L− piL, θ ·B(ηtL)},
s∗θ = b, iff θ ·B(ηtL) > max{θ · L− piL, θ · A(ηtA, ηtL)− piA},
(6)
where B(ηtL) = f(1− ηtL) and A(ηtA, ηtL) = f(1− ηtL) + g(ηtA). 11
To better illustrate the above best response, we introduce the following notations:
θtLB ,
piL
L−B(ηL) , θ
t
AB ,
piA
A(ηA, ηL)−B(ηL) , θ
t
LA ,
piL − piA
L− A(ηA, ηL) . (7)
The above three notations denote three user type thresholds. For example, θtLB is defined as the type
of user who is indifferent between choosing the leasing service and the basic service (i.e., both services
provide the user with the same expected payoff). Hence, a user with a type θ > θtLB would achieve a
higher expected payoff when choosing the leasing service than choosing the basic service. Similarly, a
user with the type threshold θtAB is indifferent between the basic service and advanced service, and a user
with the type threshold θtLA is indifferent between the leasing service and advanced service. Combining
these three user types thresholds together, we can compute the market share of each service.
Figure 3 illustrates several possible relationships among θtLB, θ
t
AB, and θ
t
LA. Intuitively, the users with
low values of θ are more willing to choose the free basic service. The users with medium values of θ
9 The main purpose of introducing the virtual time-discrete system, similar as the best response iterative algorithm in classic game theoretic
analysis, is to characterize the relation between the price and the market equilibrium, and to facilitate the calculation of database’s optimal
price strategy later. Such an analysis technique (i.e., using a dynamic system to understand the outcome of a one-shot system) has been
extensively adopted in the existing literature, e.g., [31], [32].
10Uniform assumption has been frequently used in the past networking literature (e.g., [29], [31], [33]), and the relaxation to more general
distribution often does not change the main insights.
11Here we have written η0A + η0B as 1 − η0L . For convenience, we will use ηL (the leasing service’s market share) and ηA (the advanced
service’s market share) to represent the market state, since the basic service’s market share ηB = 1− ηL − ηA can be directly computed with
ηL and ηA.
14
0 1
0 1
/HDVLQJ
LB ABT T!
LB ABT T
LAT
LAT
LBT
LBTABT
ABT
$GYDQFHGVHUYLFH 
%DVLFVHUYLFH /HDVLQJ
%DVLFVHUYLFH
Fig. 3. Illustration of θLB, θAB, and θLA.
are willing to choose the advanced service, in order to achieve a relatively large utility with a relatively
low service cost. The users with high values of θ are more willing to choose the leasing service so that
they can obtain a large utility. Notice that we have θtLB < θ
t
AB if the information price piA is high or the
information value A(ηtA, η
t
L) − B(ηtL) is low. In this case, users will not choose the advanced service, as
shown in the bottom subfugure in Figure 3.
Next we characterize the market shares in slot t + 1 due to users’ best responses. This can help us
understand the user behaviour dynamics and market evolutions in the next subsection. As we assume that
θ is uniformly distributed in [0, 1], the newly derived market shares {ηt+1L , ηt+1A } in slot t + 1, given any
market shares {ηtL, ηtA} at the end of t, are
• If θtLB > θ
t
AB, then η
t+1
L = 1− θtLA and ηt+1A = θtLA − θtAB;
• If θtLB ≤ θtAB, then ηt+1L = 1− θtLB and ηt+1A = 0.
We summarize this in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Given any pair of market shares (ηtL, ηtA) ∈ Ω at the end of slot t, the derived pair of market
shares (ηt+1L , η
t+1
A ) ∈ Ω in slot t+ 1 are given by η
t+1
L = max
{
1−max{θtLA, θtLB}, 0
}
,
ηt+1A = max
{
min{θtLA, 1} − θtAB, 0
}
,
(8)
where θtLB, θ
t
AB, and θ
t
LA are given in (7).
Under the assumption that all users update the best responses once synchronously, we can get the results
in Lemma 1. The detailed proof can be found in Appendix B. Since θtLB, θ
t
AB, and θ
t
LA are functions of
market shares {ηtL, ηtA}, the derived market shares {ηt+1L , ηt+1A } in slot t+ 1 are also functions of {ηtL, ηtA},
and hence can be written as ηt+1L (η
t
L, η
t
A) and η
t+1
A (η
t
L, η
t
A).
B. Market Dynamics and Equilibrium
When the market shares change, the users’ payoffs (on the advanced service and basic service) change
accordingly, as both A(ηtA, η
t
L) and B(η
t
L) change. As a result, users will update their best responses
repeatedly, hence the market shares will evolve dynamically until reaching a stable point (called market
15
equilibrium). In this subsection, we will study such a market dynamics and equilibrium, given fixed prices
{piL, piA} (which are decided in Stage II).
Base on the analysis in Section IV-A, let (η0L , η
0
A) ∈ Ω denote the initial market shares in slot t = 0
and (ηtL, η
t
A) ∈ Ω denote the market shares derived at the end of slot t (which serve as the initial market
shares for the next slot t + 1). We further denote 4ηL and 4ηA as the changes (dynamics) of market
shares between two successive time slots, e.g., t and t+ 1, that is,4ηL(η
t
L, η
t
A) = η
t+1
L − ηtL,
4ηA(ηtL, ηtA) = ηt+1A − ηtA,
(9)
where (ηt+1L , η
t+1
A ) ∈ Ω are the derived market share in slot t+ 1, and can be computed by Lemma 1.
Obviously, if both 4ηL and 4ηA are zero in a slot t+1, i.e., ηt+1L = ηtL and ηt+1A = ηtA, then users will no
longer change their strategies in the future. This implies that the market achieves the market equilibrium.
Formally,
Definition 1 (Market Equilibrium). A pair of market shares η∗ = {η∗L , η∗A} ∈ Ω is a market equilibrium,
if and only if
4ηL(η∗L , η∗A) = 0, and 4ηA(η∗L , η∗A) = 0. (10)
Next, we study the existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium, and further characterize the
market equilibrium analytically. These results will help us analyze the price competition game in Stage
II (Section V).
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness). Given any feasible price pair (piL, piA), there exists at least one
market equilibrium (η∗L , η
∗
A) ∈ Ω. Furthermore, the market equilibrium is unique and the market dynamics
globally converges to it starting from any initial point {η0L , η0A} ∈ Ω if
max
(ηL,ηA)∈Ω
g′(ηA)
g(ηA)
· L−B(ηL)
L− A(ηA, ηL) ≤
1
κ
, (11)
where κ = max(ηL,ηA)∈Ω{ piL−piAL−A(ηA,ηL) , piAA(ηA,ηL)−B(ηL)}, and g′(ηA) is the first-order derivative of g(·) with
respect to ηA.
We prove the convergence of this market dynamics based on the contraction mapping theorem [40],
with the detailed proof in Appendix C. A practical implication of condition (11) is that the existence
of a unique equilibrium requires the information value g(ηA) (which corresponds to positive network
externality) increases slowly with ηA. Note that the condition (11) is sufficient but not necessary for the
uniqueness. Our numerical simulations show that the market converges to a unique equilibrium for a wide
range of prices, even when the condition (11) is violated. Nevertheless, the sufficient condition in (11)
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suggests that there could be multiple equilibrium points if the impact of positive network externality is
significant.
Suppose the uniqueness condition (11) is satisfied. We characterize the unique equilibrium by the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Market Equilibrium). Suppose the uniqueness condition (11) holds. Then, for any feasible
price pair (piL, piA),
(a) If θLB(ηL, ηA)|ηL=0 ≤ θAB(ηL, ηA)|ηA=0, there is a unique market equilibrium η† = {η†L, η†A} satisfies
η†L = 1− θLB(η†L, η†A), and η†A = 0; (12)
(b) If θLB(ηL, ηA)|ηL=0 > θAB(ηL, ηA)|ηA=0, there is a unique market equilibrium η∗ = {η∗L , η∗A} satisfies η
∗
L = 1− θLA(η∗L , η∗A),
η∗A = θLA(η
∗
L , η
∗
A)− θAB(η∗L , η∗A).
(13)
Proof. First, we obtain the derived market shares by substituting the market shares given in (12) or (13)
into (8). Then, we can check that the above derived market shares satisfy the equilibrium condition (10).
For the detailed proof, please refer to Appendix D.
A practical implication of Theorem 1 is that the information price piA should not be too high or the
information value (i.e., A − B) should be large enough; otherwise, no users will choose the advance
service at the equilibrium.
V. STAGE II – PRICE COMPETITION GAME EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we study the price competition between the database and the spectrum licensee in Stage
II, given the commission negotiation solution in Stage I. Based on the analysis of Stage III in Section IV,
the database and spectrum licensee are able to predict the user behavior and market equilibrium in Stage
III when making their pricing decisions. We will analyze the pricing equilibrium under both the revenue
sharing scheme (RSS) and the wholesale price scheme (WPS).
Definition 2 (Price Competition Game). The Price Competition Game (PCG) is defined as follows.
• Players: The database and the spectrum licensee;
• Strategies: Information price piA ≥ 0 for the database, and piL ≥ 0 for the licensee;
• Payoffs: Payoff is defined in (2) under RSS, and in (61) under WPS.
For the rest of this section, we assume that condition (8) holds. Then, we write the unique market equi-
librium η∗ = {η∗L , η∗A} in Stage III as functions of prices (piL, piA), i.e., η∗L(piL, piA) and η∗A(piL, piA). Intuitively,
we can interpret η∗L and η
∗
A as the demand functions of the licensee and the database, respectively.
17
A. Revenue Sharing Scheme — RSS
We fist study the game equilibrium under RSS, where the licensee shares a fixed percentage δ ∈ [0, 1]
of revenue with the database. By (2), the payoffs of the licensee and the database can be written as: Π
SL
(I)(piL, piA) = (piL − cL) · η∗L(piL, piA) · (1− δ),
ΠDB(I) (piL, piA) = (piA − cA)η∗A(piL, piA) + (piL − cL)η∗L(piL, piA)δ.
(14)
Definition 3 (Price Equilibrium). A price pair (pi∗L , pi∗A) is a Nash equilibrium, if
pi∗L = arg max
piL≥0
ΠSL(I)(piL, pi
∗
A),
pi∗A = arg max
piA≥0
ΠDB(I) (pi
∗
L , piA).
(15)
It is difficult to analytically characterize the market equilibrium {η∗L(piL, piA), η∗A(piL, piA)} under a par-
ticular price pair {piL, piA}. We tackle this challenge by transforming the original price competition game
(PCG) into an equivalent market share competition game (MSCG). In such a case, the market shares are
the strategies of the database and the licensee, while the prices are the functions of the market shares.
A key observation of such a transformation is that, under the uniqueness condition (11), there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the market equilibrium {η∗L , η∗A} and the prices {piL, piA}. Because of this,
once the licensee and the database choose the prices {piL, piA}, they have equivalently chosen the market
shares {η∗L , η∗A}. Substitute θLA = piL−piAL−A and θAB = piAA−B into (13), we can derive the inverse function of
(13), where prices are functions of market shares defined on Ω, i.e.,12 piL(ηL, ηA) =(1− ηL) · (L− f(1− ηL)− g(ηA)) + (1− ηL − ηA) · g(ηA),piA(ηL, ηA) =(1− ηL − ηA) · g(ηA). (16)
The payoffs of the database and the licensee can be rewritten as: Π˜
SL
(I)(ηL, ηA) = (piL(ηL, ηA)− cL) · ηL · (1− δ),
Π˜DB(I) (ηL, ηA) = (piA(ηL, ηA)− cA)ηA + (piL(ηL, ηA)− cL)ηLδ.
(17)
Definition 4 (Market Share Competition Game). The equivalent Market Share Competition Game (MSCG)
is defined as follows.
• Players: The database and the spectrum licensee;
• Strategies: Market share ηA for the database, and ηL for the licensee, where (ηL, ηA) ∈ Ω;
• Payoffs: Payoffs are defined in (17).
12Note that we omit the trivial case in (12), where the database has a zero market share in terms of the advanced service. In this case, the
licensee can determine the market share splitting (between leasing service and basic service from the database) by optimizing his leasing
price piL.
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Definition 5 (Market Share Equilibrium). Market shares (η∗L , η∗A) ∈ Ω is a Market Share Equilibrium if
η∗L = arg maxηL Π
SL
(I)(ηL, η
∗
A), and η
∗
A = arg maxηA Π
DB
(I) (η
∗
L , ηA). (18)
We first show that the equivalence between the original PCG and the above MSCG.
Proposition 2 (Equivalent Games). If {η∗L , η∗A} is a Market Share Equilibrium of MSCG, then {pi∗L , pi∗A}
given by (16) is a Price Equilibrium of PCG.
We next characterzie the Market Share Equilibrium of the MSCG. We first give the following proposition
which bounds the market shares maximizing the database’s and the licensee’s expected payoffs in (18).
Proposition 3 (Boundary of Market Share Equilibrium). For any {η∗L , η∗A} that is a solution of (18), we
have η∗L ∈ (0, 1/2) and η∗L + η∗A < 1.
Proposition 3 shows that the licensee will achieve an equilibrium market share that is smaller than half.
Intuitively, the objective of the licensee is to maximize its own profit, and a larger market share of licensee
corresponds to a smaller market price, which does not necessarily increase the licensee’s profit. Another
key insight of Proposition 3 is that considering (18) alone is enough to guarantee the feasibility constraint
of (ηL, ηA) ∈ Ω in Definition 5. Hence, we can study the existence and uniqueness of the MSCG market
share equilibrium by analyzing (18) only.
Theorem 2 (Existence and Uniqueness of Market Share Equilibrium). Given the commission charge δ,
there exists at least one Market Share Equilibrium of MSCG (η∗L , η
∗
A) ∈ Ω. Furthermore, a sufficient
condition for the uniqueness of the market share equilibrium is
∂2Π˜SL(I)(ηL,ηA)
∂ηL2
≤ ∂2Π˜SL(I)(ηL,ηA)
∂ηL∂ηA
and
∂2Π˜DB(I) (ηL,ηA)
∂ηA2
≤ ∂2Π˜DB(I) (ηL,ηA)
∂ηA∂ηL
, ∀(ηL, ηA) ∈ Ω. (19)
Proof Sketch. First, we can prove that the MSCG is a supermodular game (with a proper strategy trans-
formation), and thus has at least one Nash Equilibrium. Based on the supermodular game theory [14], the
MSCG has a unique Nash Equilibrium as long as it satisfies the sufficient condition given in (19).
For a supermodular game with a unique Nash equilibrium, several commonly used updating rules are
guaranteed to converged to the NE [14]. In this paper, we use the best response algorithm as in [34]. Due
to the space limit, we provide the detailed algorithm in Appendix I.
Once we obtain the Market Share Equilibrium (η∗L , η
∗
A) of MSCG, we can compute the Price Equilibrium
(pi∗L , pi
∗
A) of the original PCG by (16)
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B. Wholesale Pricing Scheme — WPS
We now study the game equilibrium under WPS, where the database charges a fixed wholesale price
w ≥ 0 from each successful transaction of the licensee. By (61), the payoffs of the licensee and the
database can be written as:Π
SL
(II)(piL, piA) = (piL − w) · η∗L(piL, piA)− cLη∗L(piL, piA),
ΠDB(II)(piL, piA) = (piA − cA) · η∗A(piL, piA) + w · η∗L(piL, piA).
(20)
With the similar analysis used in Section V-A, we can transform the Price Competiton Game (PCG)
into an equivalent Market Share Competition Game (MSCG), and show that the MSCG is a supermodular
game. Our key results about the existence and uniqueness of game equilibrium are as follows.
Theorem 3. Given the wholesale price w, there exists a unique Market Share Equilibrium η∗L ∈ (0, 1/2)
and η∗L + η
∗
A < 1 for the MSCG, and thus a unique Price Equilibrium, if the following conditions are
satisfied
∂2Π˜SL(II)(ηL,ηA)
∂ηL2
≤ ∂2Π˜SL(II)(ηL,ηA)
∂ηL∂ηA
and
∂2Π˜DB(II)(ηL,ηA)
∂ηA2
≤ ∂2Π˜DB(II)(ηL,ηA)
∂ηA∂ηL
, ∀(ηL, ηA) ∈ Ω. (21)
The detailed discussions in Appendix H.
Although we use the similar method to derive the Nash equilibrium of the PCG game under both RSS
and WPS, these two equilibria are quite different. Intuitively, under RSS, the objective of the database
is consistent with that of the licensee. This can be shown by the common term in both players’ payoffs
given in (14). Hence, the database becomes less aggressive in competing with spectrum licensee under
RSS that under WPS.
To emphasize the fact that the equilibrium payoffs in Stage II depend on δ (under RSS) or w (under
WPS), we will write the equilibrium payoff of the database as ΠDB(I) (δ) under RSS and Π
DB
(II)(w) under
WPS. Similarly, we will write the equilibrium payoff of the licensee as ΠSL(I)(δ) under RSS and Π
SL
(II)(w)
under WPS.
VI. STAGE I – COMMISSION BARGAINING SOLUTION
In this section, we study the commission negotiation among the database and the spectrum licensee
in Stage I, based on their predictions of the price equilibrium in Stage II and the market equilibrium in
Stage III13.
Specifically, we want to find a feasible revenue sharing percentage δ ∈ [0, 1] under RSS, or a feasible
wholesale price w ≥ 0 under WPS, that is satisfactory for both the database and the spectrum licensee.
13In our proposed bargaining model, the database and the licensee only conduct the bargaining if this leads to a payoff increase for both
sides. Otherwise they can choose not to bargain and do not cooperate in Stage I. Furthermore, based on the discussions in the previous
paragraph, we can see that the licensee does not have the full market power. Hence a bargaining model is suitable for such a market.
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This is motivated by the fact that both the database operator (e.g., Google, Microsoft, and SpectrumBridge)
and spectrum licensees (e.g., AT&T, Verizon, and China Mobile) have considerable market power, and one
side can not determine δ or w alone. We formulate the commission negotiation problem as a bargaining
problem, and solve it using the Nash bargaining theory [13].
A. Revenue Sharing Percentage δ-Bargaining under RSS
We first study RSS, where we want to determine the revenue sharing percentage δ ∈ [0, 1].
We first derive the database’s and the licensee’s payoffs when reaching an agreement and when
not reaching any agreement. This allows us to characterize the payoff improvements due to successful
bargaining.
Formally, when reaching an agreement δ, the database’s and the licensee’s payoffs are ΠDB(I) (δ) and Π
SL
(I)(δ)
derived in Section V-A, respectively. When not reaching any agreement (reaching the disagreement), the
licensee’s profit is ΠSL0 = 0, and the database’s profit is Π
DB
0 = pi
†
A · η†A(pi†A), where pi†A and η†A(pi†A) are the
database’s optimal price and the corresponding market share in the pure information market.14 Then, the
Nash bargaining solution is the solution of the following optimziation problem,
max
δ∈[0,1]
(
ΠDB(I) (δ)− ΠSL0
) · (ΠSL(I)(δ)− ΠDB0 )
s. t. ΠDB(I) (δ) ≥ ΠSL0 , ΠSL(I)(δ) ≥ ΠDB0 .
(22)
Analytically solving (22) may be difficult, if we are not able to analytically characterize ΠDB(I) (δ) and
ΠSL(I)(δ). Nevertheless, we notice that the bargaining variable δ lies in a closed and bounded range of [0, 1],
and the objective function of (22) is bounded. Hence, there exists at least one optimal solution for (22).
As our numerical results show that the obejctive function of (22) is approximately quadratic in δ, the
optimal solution is unique and can be found by using one-dimensional search methods (e.g., [35]).
B. Wholesale Price w-Bargaining under WPS
We now study WPS, where the database charges the spectrum licensee a fixed wholesale price w ≥ 0
for each successful transaction of the latter.
When reaching an agreement w, the database’s and the licensee’s payoffs are ΠDB(II)(w) and Π
SL
(II)(w)
derived in Section V-B, respectively. When not reaching any agreement (reaching the disagreement), the
licensee’s profit is ΠSL0 = 0, and the database’s profit is Π
DB
0 = pi
†
A · η†A(pi†A), which is same as that under
RSS (Section VI-A). The Nash bargaining problem is
max
w≥0
(
ΠDB(II)(w)− ΠSL0
) · (ΠSL(II)(w)− ΠDB0 )
s. t. ΠDB(II)(w) ≥ ΠSL0 , ΠSL(II)(w) ≥ ΠDB0 .
(23)
14Such an optimal price and the corresponding market share can be derived in the same way as in Section V-A, by simply setting θLA = 1.
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We further notice that that we can restrict the bargaining variable w within a closed and bounded set,
say [0, L], while not affecting the optimality of the solution. This is no user will choose the leasing service
when w > L, in which case the spectrum licensee will get a zero payoff. This is certainly not an optimal
solution of (23). Similar as Section VI-A, there would exist a unique solution for (23) as shown in our
simulations, and which can be found effectively through one-dimensional numerical search.
VII. SIMULATION RESULT
We evaluate the system performance (e.g., the database’s profit, the network profit, and the social
welfare) achieved under both revenue sharing scheme (RSS) and wholesale price scheme (WPS) through
extensive numerical studies. We will focus on the impact of system parameters (i.e., the degree of network
externality and the licensee’s operating cost) on system performance.
A. Simulation Setting
As a concrete example, we choose f(ηL) = α1 − β1 · (1 − ηL)γ1 to model the negative network
externality with the following justifications. First, when ηL = 1, there is no congestion among users
choosing unlicensed TV channels, as all users lease licensed TV channels for exclusive usage. In this
case, the utility provided by the basic service is α1. Second, when ηL = 0, all users choose the shared
unlicensed TV channels, and the congestion is maximum. In this case, the utility provided by the basic
service decreases to α1−β1. Finally, the parameter γ1 ∈ (0, 1] models the elasticity of the negative network
externality. A small γ1 means that the value of f(ηL) will be small even with a large ηL. This means that
a small fraction of users using unlicensed TV channels will cause a large enough congestion.
Similarly, we use function g(ηA) = α2 + (β2 − α2) · ηAγ2 to model the positive network externality.
Specifically, α1 denotes the minimum benefit brought by the database’s advanced information on unli-
censed TV channels occupation, and β2 denotes the maximum benefit brought by the database’s advanced
information. The parameter γ2 ∈ (0, 1] characterizes the elasticity of the positive network externality.15
To characterize the interaction of negative and positive network externality in the information market,
we first derive the first-order derivative of A with respect to ηA, i.e., ∂A∂ηA = −γ1 · β1 · (ηA + ηB)γ1−1 + γ2 ·
β2 · (ηA)γ2−1. Notice that if ∂A∂ηA > 0, the value of advance information increases with the market share
ηA (i.e., the percentage of users purchasing the advanced information). We call this the positive network
externality dominant case (or simply positive dominant). On the other hand, if ∂A
∂ηA
< 0, the value of
advance information decreases with the market share ηA. We call this the negative network externality
dominant case (or simply negative dominant).
15These two functions generalize the linear network externality models from many existing literatures such as [36], satisfy our Assumptions
2 and 3, and are used to model the network effect in the literature (see, e.g., [37]).
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Fig. 4. (a) The database’s profit, (b) The licensee’s profit, (c) Network profit vs the level of network externality λ under the revenue sharing
scheme (RSS) and the wholesale price scheme (WPS).
To facilicate our study, we set γ1 = γ2 and change the value of β1 and β2 to examine different cases
of network externality. Specifically, we use λ = β2/β1 to represent the degree of network externality.
Obviously, if λ = β2/β1 > (ηA+ηBηA )
1−γ1 , then ∂A
∂ηA
> 0 for any {ηA, ηB}, hence the information market is
positive dominant. If λ < (ηA+ηB
ηA
)1−γ1 , then ∂A
∂ηA
< 0, hence the information market is negative dominant.
Hence an increasing value of λ implies that the positive network externality is getting relatively stronger.
Unless specified otherwise, we assume that α1 = 1, α2 = 1, β1 = 1, γ1 = 0.6, γ2 = 0.6, and cA = 0.2
in the rest of the numerical studies.
B. The Impact of Network Effect Parameter λ
Figure 4 illustrates (a) the database’s profit, (b) the licensee’s profit, and (c) the network profit, i.e., the
aggregate profit of the database and the licensee achieved under different network effect. Here we choose
λ from 0.4 to 1.8, i.e., the network effect changes from strong negative externality to strong positive
externality. In this simulation, we fix the licensee’s operational cost as cL = 0.9 and the quality of leasing
service as L = 6.
In Figure 4.c, we use the black dash-dot line (with mark +) to denote the coordination benchmark,
where the database and the licensee act as an integrated party to maximize their aggregate profit. We use
the red dash-dot line (with mark ×) to denote the non-cooperation benchmark (with pure information
market only), where the database does not display the licensee’s licensed TV channel information. The
brown dash-dot line (with mark •) denotes the case where the licensee sells channels on a third-party
spectrum market platform, where the licensee can display his licensed information for free. In a third-
party scheme, the licensee displays his licensed information in a third-party platform, instead of using
the database’s platform. Comparing with the three-stage model, such a third-party model degenerates to
a two-stage model, where the database and the licensee compete with each other for selling information
or channels to users in Stage I, and users decide the best subscription decisions in Stage II.
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The key observations from Figure 4 are as follows.
Observation 1.
(a) The database’s profits achieved under both schemes increase with λ (Figure 4.a), while the
licensee’s profits achieved under both schemes decrease with λ (Figure 4.b).
(b) When the negative network externality is dominant (λ is small), RSS is a better choice for the
database; When the positive network externaltiy is dominant (λ is large), WPS is a better choice
for the database (Figure 4.a).
(c) WPS is always a better choice for the licensee (Figure 4.b).
(d) The proposed RSS and WPS alway outperform the non-cooperation scheme and the third-party
scheme in terms of network profit. (e.g., the performance gain between WPS and the non-
cooperation scheme is up to 87%). Meanwhile, both schemes can achieve a network profit close
to the co-ordinated benchmark (Figure 4.c).
In the following, we discuss the the intuitions behind each observation in detail.
Observation 1(a): When the positive network externality becomes stronger, the advanced service pro-
vides a higher utility to users. Such a higher utility drives the equilibrium price as well as the equilibrium
market share up for the database, which results in the increase of the database’s profit. To keep the
leasing service attractive, the licensee needs to drive the equilibrium retail price down, which results in
the decrease of the licensee’s profit.
Observation 1(b): As the objective of the database and the licensee are partially coordinated under RSS
[26], the price competition under WPS is more severe than that under RSS. When the negative network
externality is dominant, the increase of the database’s market share may severely decrease the quality of
advanced service. In this case, it is better for the database to let the licensee take a large fraction of the
market share and share the revenue of the licensee through RSS. On the other hand, when the positive
network externality is dominant, a larger market share can significantly increase the attractiveness of the
database. Hence the database is able to get a higher profit with the more aggressive WPS.
Observation 1(c): As the database charges a fixed price per transaction to the licensee under WPS, the
licensee can enjoy the full benefit of putting effort to maximize its own profit (e.g., increasing the leasing
service price to serve a minority of users with high values of θ). Under RSS, however, some benefit from
serving users would go to the database, as the licensee needs to share a fixed portion of the revenue with
the database. In such case, the licensee would like to exert a higher effort under WPS than RSS, hence
can achieve a higher payoff under WPS.
Observation 1(d): Under our proposed schemes (i.e., RSS and WPS), the database and the licensee
negotiate with each other in Stage I. The third-party scheme does not involve such negotiation process
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Fig. 5. (a) The database’s profit, (b) The licensee’s profit, (c) Network profit vs the licensee’s operational cost cL under the revenue sharing
scheme (RSS) and the wholesale price scheme (WPS).
and can not exploit the cooperation benefit, hence performs worse than our proposed schemes. Compared
with the pure information market, letting some users to lease the licensed TV channels alleviates the
congestion (interference) of the unlicensed TV channels. Hence, the database can provide a good quality
of service to users at a higher price, which increases the network profit. The performance gap between
the two proposed schemes and coordination benchmark is caused by the imperfect coordination of the
database and the licensee. The database and licensee cooperate but do not completely coordinate (i.e., act
as a single decision maker), and we refer to this gap as the non-coordination loss.
We want to emphasize that even though the pure cooperation model can achieve the maximum network
profit, the regulators such as FCC in the United States and Ofcom in UK would not allow the licensee
to be a database. As shown in the FCC’s ruling, the database is certified by a third-party company which
does not own the spectrum. The rational for this is to prevent the monopoly in the market that may
jeopardize the interest of end-users.
C. The Impact of the Licensee’s Operational Cost cL
Figure 5 is similar as Figures 4, except that here we focus on the impact of licensee’s operational
cost cL (which incorporates costs due to energy consumptions). We choose cL from 0.1 to 1.5, and fix
the degree of network externality as λ = 1.8 (i.e., the positive network externality is dominant) and the
quality of leasing service as L = 6.
We list the key observations from Figure 5 as follows.
Observation 2.
(a) The database’s and the licensee’s profits achieved under both schemes decrease with the li-
censee’s operational cost cL (Figures 5.a and 5.b).
(b) The non-coordination loss between the proposed two schemes and the coordination benchmark
increases with the licensee’s operational cost cL (Figure 5.c).
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(c) The performance gain between the proposed two schemes and the non-cooperation pure infor-
mation market decreases with the licensee’s operational cost cL (Figure 5.c).
In the following, we discuss the intuitions of each observation in detail.
Observation 2(a): As the licensee’s operational cost increases, the licensee needs to increase its service
price, which results in the decrease of the licensee’s market share and the profit. Meanwhile, the database’s
revenue earned from the licensee decreases, and thus leads to the decrease of the database’s profit.
Observation 2(b): Due to the increase of the licensee’s operational cost, the licensee may not be willing
to provide the leasing service. Hence, it is more difficult to reach an agreement during the negotiation
process in Stage I, which results in a high non-coordination loss.
Observation 2(c): As the licensee would raise the service price in order to compensate its revenue loss
due to its higher operational cost, the leasing service becomes less attractive to users. With the decreased
benefit brought by the spectrum market, the proposed schemes becoming increasingly similar as the pure
information market.
D. Social Welfare
Figure 6 shows the social welfare, i.e, the summation of the payoffs of the licensee, the database, and
the users, under both RSS and WPS. The x-axis represents the licensee’s operational cost cL from 0.2
to 2. The lines with circle markers denote the performance of RSS, and the lines with triangle markers
denote the performance of WPS. Comparing different groups of curves, we can see the impact of the
degree of network externality (λ) and the quality of leasing service (L).
Observation 3. RSS always outperforms WPS in terms of social welfare.
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Intuitively, more users are attracted by the leasing service under RSS, due to less market competition
between the database and the licensee. Hence RSS leads to a higher social welfare.
We also observe that the social welfare increases with leasing spectrum quality L and decreases with
the licensee’s operational cost cL. This is very intuitive, as the social welfare increases when the overall
system is more effective (i.e., a larger L or with a smaller cL).
VIII. CONCLUSION
Relying database to detect the dynamically changing radio environment can not only reduce the energy
consumption of the unlicensed radio devices, but also can effectively help the devices to balance the
energy consumption and communication quality. Hence, the database-assisted TV white space network
is a promising commercial applications of green cognitive communication technology. As the success of
such a network replies on a carefully designed business model, we propose a database-provided integrated
spectrum and information market, and analyzed the interactions among the geo-location database, the
licensee, and the unlicensed users systematically. We also analyze how the negative and positive network
externalities (of the information market) affect these interactions. Our work characterizes what commission
charge scheme is better in terms of maximizing database’s and licensee’s own profits under different
degrees of network externality. Specifically, when the negative network externality is dominant, RSS is a
better choice for the database, while WPS is a better choice for the licensee. When the positive network
externality is dominant, WPS is a better choice for both the database and the licensee.
There are several possible directions to extend this work. First, we have assumed that the database
and the licensee have the same bargaining power. Asymmetric bargaining power will lead to a dif-
ferent formulation and result. Second, we have assumed that the representative licensee has enough
licensed TV channels for leasing. A more practical model is to consider the scenario with limited number
of licensed TV channels. In this case, the licensee needs to increase its price at the equilibrium, so as to
reduce the excess demand to the unlicensed channels. When this happens, the database may choose to
increase its information price accordingly. Hence, both prices under the equilibrium are likely to be higher
than those derived in our current model. The detailed analysis for the more general model, however, is much
more challenging than the one for our current model. This is because with licensed channel limitation, the
equivalent market share competition game in Stage II is no longer a super-modular game and the current
analysis no longer applies. Third, we can further investigate an oligopoly scenario with multiple databases
and licensees. If there are multiple databases that sell information of the unlicensed TV channels and
multiple licensees who have the under-utilized licensed TV channels to lease, an end-user needs to decide
from whom to buy the service in order to maximize its utility. Such a user subscription model in Stage
III can be characterized by the Fisher market model [41], [42], by considering the unlicensed channel
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information as a product of a database and the licensed TV channel as a product of a licensee. And
the equilibrium product allocation can be captured by Eisenberg-Gale convex program [43]. However, as
shown in Section III.C, the information market has the positive network externality where the value of a
database’s product (i.e., the unlicensed channels’ information) increases with the number of buyers. Hence,
the market equilibrium in Stage III requires new analytical method that incorporates the Fisher market
model with the positive network externality. Besides, such an oligopoly scenario involves the formulation
of a much more challenging one-to-many bargaining problem in Stage I (e.g., [44], [45]). This poses
a range of new questions: Should the database bargain with all licensees or just a subset of licensees?
Should the database bargain with licensees sequentially or concurrently? If bargaining sequentially, how
should the database choose the bargaining sequence to maximize its payoff? All these questions deserve
careful study in our future work.
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APPENDIX
A. Property of Information Market
In this section, we will discuss the negative and positive network externalities in the information market
with a concrete example. We first define the advanced information as the interference level on each channel,
then we characterize the information value to the users. Based on that, we can further characterize the
properties of the information market.
1) Interference Information: For each user n ∈ N , it will experience an interference level, if it transmits
on an unlicensed TV channel k, denoted by zn,k. This reflects the aggregate interference from all other
nearby devices (including TV stations and other users) operating on this channel. Due to the time varying
nature of wireless channels as well stochastic user mobilities and activities, we consider interference zn,k
as a random variable with the following assumption:
Assumption 4. For each user n ∈ N , the interference level zn,k experienced on each channel k, is
temporal-independence and frequency-independence.
This assumption shows that (i) the interference zn,k on channel k is independent identically distributed
(i.i.d.) at different times, and (ii) the interferences on different channels, zn,k, k ∈ K, are also i.i.d. at the
same time. 16 As we concern about a generic user n, we will abuse the notation and omit the user
index n (e.g., write zn,k as zk) whenever there is no confusion caused. We will use Hz(·) and hz(·) to
denote the common cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability distribution function (PDF)
of zk, ∀k ∈ K.17
A user’s experienced interference zk on a TV channel k consists of the following three components:
1) vk: the interference from licensed TV stations;
2) wk,m: the interference from another user m operating on the same channel k;
3) ok: any other interference from outside systems.
The total interference experienced by this user on channel k is zk = vk+wk+ok, where wk ,
∑
m∈Nk wk,m
is the total interference from all other users operating on channel k (denoted by Nk). Similar to zk, we also
16Note that the iid assumption is a reasonable approximation of the practical scenario, where all channel quality distributions are the same
but the realized instant qualities of different channels are different (e.g., [38], [39]). Such i.i.d. assumptions allow us to focus on the system
level behaviors and derive useful insights for the next step more detailed interference modeling.
17In general, we will conventionally use HX(·) and hX(·) to denote the CDF and PDF of a random variable X , respectively.
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assume that vk, wk, wk,m, and ok are random variables with temporal-independence (i.e., i.i.d. across time)
and frequency-independence (i.e., i.i.d. across frequency). We further have the following assumption:
Assumption 5. The interference wk,m from user m operating on the channel k is user-independence, i.e.,
wk,m are i.i.d. across user index m.
It is important to note that different users may experience different interferences vk (from TV
stations), wk,m (from another user m operating on the same TV channel), and ok (from outside
systems) on a channel k, as we have omitted the user index n for all these notations for clarity.
Next we discuss these interferences in more details.
• The database is able to compute the interference vk from TV stations to every user (on channel k),
as it knows the locations and channel occupancies of all TV stations.
• The database cannot compute the interference ok from outside systems, due to the lack of outside
interference source information. Thus, the interference ok will not be included in a database’s advanced
information sold to users.
• The ability of the database to compute the interference wk,m, depends on whether user m subscribes
to the database’s advanced service. Specifically, if user m subscribes to the advanced service, the
database can predict use m’s channel selection (since the user will choose the channel with the lowest
interference level indicated by the database in the advanced information), and thus can compute its
interference to any other user (based on the locations of these two users). However, if user m only
chooses the database’s basic service, the database cannot predict its channel selection, and thus cannot
compute its interference to other users.
For convenience, we denote N [a]k as the set of users operating on TV channel k and subscribing to the
database’s advance service (i.e., those choosing the strategy s = a), and N [b]k as the set of users operating
on channel k and choosing the database’s basic service (i.e., those choosing the strategy s = b). That is,
N [a]k
⋃N [b]k = Nk. Then, for a particular user,
• its experienced interference18 (on channel k) known by the database is
z¯k , vk +
∑
m∈N [a]k
wk,m, (24)
which contains the interference from TV licensees and all users (operating on channel k) subscribing
to the database’s advanced service.
• its experienced interference (on channel k) not known by the database is
zˆk , ok +
∑
m∈N [b]k
wk,m, (25)
18We assume that this user has not decided which service to choose yet, and hence it is not in the set of Nk.
31
which contains the interference from outside systems and all users (operating on channel k) choosing
the database’s basic service.
Obviously, both zˆk and z¯k are also random variables with temporal- and frequency-independence.
Accordingly, the total interference on TV channel k for a user can be written as zk = z¯k + zˆk.
Since the database knows only z¯k, it will provide this information (instead of the total interference
zk) as the advanced service to a subscribing user. It is easy to see that the more users subscribing
to the database’s advanced service, the more information the database knows, and the more accurate the
database information will be.
Next we can characterize the accuracy of a database’s information explicitly. Note that ηA and ηL denote
the fraction of users choosing the advanced service and leasing licensed spectrum, respectively. Moreover,
(1− ηA − ηL) denotes the fraction of users choosing the basic service. Hence, there are (1− ηL) ·N users
in the network that we consider operating on the (unlicensed) TV channels. Due to Assumption 4, it is
reasonable to assume that each channel k ∈ K will be occupied by an average of N
K
· (1−ηL) users. Then,
among all N
K
· (1− ηL) users operating on channel k, there are, on average, NK · ηA users subscribing to the
database’s advanced service, and N
K
· (1 − ηA − ηL) users choosing the database’s basic service. That is,
|Nk| = NK · (1− ηL), |N [a]k | = NK · ηA, and |N [b]k | = NK · (1− ηA− ηL).19 Finally, by the user-independence of
wk,m, we can immediately calculate the distributions of z¯k and zˆk under any given market share ηA and
ηL via (24) and (25).
2) Information Value: Now we evaluate the value of the database’s advanced information to users,
which is reflected by the user’s benefit (utility) that can be achieved from this information. Based on this,
we can characterize the properties of functions f and g.
We first consider the expected utility of a user when choosing the database’s basic service (i.e., s = b).
In this case, the user will randomly choosing a TV channel based on the information provided in the free
basic service. We use R0 to denote the rate of such a user, which is a function of the number of users
choosing the basic and advanced services, 1− ηL:
R0(1− ηL) = EZ [R(z)] =
∫
z
R(z)dHz(z). (26)
Here R(·) is the transmission rate function (e.g., the Shannon capacity) as the function of the interference
(assuming a fixed transmission power and channel between the transmitter and the intended receiver). As
shown in Section A1, each channel k ∈ K will be occupied by an average of N
K
· (1− ηL) users based on
the Assumption 4. Hence, R0(1 − ηL) depends only on the distribution of the total interference zk, and
19Note that the above discussion is from the aspect of expectation, and in a particular time period, the realized numbers of users in different
channels may be different.
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thus depends on the fraction of users operating on TV channels (i.e., 1 − ηL). Then the expected utility
provided by the basic service is
B(1− ηL) = U
(
R0(1− ηL)
)
, (27)
where U(·) is the utility function of the user. We can easily check that the more users operating on the
TV channels, the higher value of zk is, and thus the lower expected utility provided by the basic service.
Hence, the basic service’s expected utility reflects the congestion level of the TV channels. We use the
function f(·) to characterize the congestion effect and have f(1− ηL) = B(1− ηL).
Then we consider the expected utility of a user when subscribing to the database’s advance service. In
this case, the database returns the interference information {z¯k}k∈K to the user subscribing to the advanced
service, together with the basic information such as the available channel list. A rational user will always
choose the channel with the minimum z¯k (since {zˆk}k∈K are i.i.d.). Let z¯[l]MIN = min{z¯1, . . . , z¯K} denote
the minimum interference indicated by the database’s advanced information. Then, the actual interference
experienced by a user (subscribing to the database’s advanced service) can be formulated as the sum of
two random variables, denoted by z(a) = z¯MIN + zˆ. Accordingly, the user’s expected data rate under the
strategy s = a can be computed by
Ra(ηA, ηL) = Ez(a)
[R (z(a)) ] = ∫zR(z)dHz(a)(z), (28)
where Hz(a)(z) is the CDF of z(a). It is easy to see that Ra depends on the distributions of z¯k and zˆk,
and thus depend on the market share ηL and ηA. Thus, we will write Ra as Ra(ηL, ηA). Accordingly, the
advanced service’s utility is:
A(ηL, ηA) , U
(
Ra(ηL, ηA)
)
(29)
Note that the congestion effect also affects the value of A. However, compared with the utility of user
choosing basic service, the benefit of a user subscribing to the database’s advanced information comes
from z¯[l]MIN, i.e., the minimum interference indicated by the database’s advanced information. As the value
of z¯[l]MIN depends on ηA only, we can get the approximation A = f(1 − ηL) + g(ηA), where function g(·)
characterizes the benefit brought by z¯[l]MIN and denotes the positive network effect.
By further checking the properties of B(1− ηL) and A(ηL, ηA), we have Assumption 2 and Assumption
3 in Section III-C.
B. Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. By solving (6), we can get the three thresholds as:
θLB , piLL−B(ηL) , θAB ,
piA
A(ηA,ηL)−B(ηL) , θLA ,
piL−piA
L−A(ηA,ηL) . (30)
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When θLB > θAB, it is easy to check that
θLA − θLB = piL(A(ηA,ηL)−B(ηL))−piA(L−B(ηL))(L−A(ηA,ηL))(L−B(ηL)) > 0,
since L > A(ηA, ηL), L > B(ηL), and piL(A − B) > piA(L − B) as θLB > θAB. Hence, we have: θLA >
θLB > θAB. Moreover, when θLB > θAB, the newly derived market shares are:
ηL = 1− θLA, ηA = θLA − θAB,
When θLB < θAB, we can similarly check that θLA− θLB < 0, and hence θLA < θLB < θAB. Moreover, the
newly derived market shares {ηL, ηA}, given the prices {piL, piA} and initial market shares {η0L , η0A}, are
ηL = 1− θLB, ηA = 0.
Formally, we can get (8).
C. Proof for Proposition 1
Proof. By Definition 1, η∗ = {η∗L , η∗A} is an equilibrium point if and only if it is a solution of (10). If
θLB < θAB, the solution η = {ηL, ηA} should satisfy that:
4ηL(ηL, ηA) = 1− piL
L− f(ηL) − ηL = 0; and 4ηA(ηL, ηA) = 0− ηA = 0. (31)
we can easily get that η∗A = 0. Moreover, We can check that 4ηL(ηL, ηA)|ηL=0 > 0 and 4ηL(ηL, ηA)|ηL=1 <
0. As 4ηL(ηL, ηA) is continuous on [0, 1], we can get the conclusion that 4ηL(ηL, ηA) = 0 has a root on
the domain of ηL.
If θLB > θAB, the solution η∗ = {η∗L , η∗A} should satisfy that:
4ηL(ηL, ηA) = 1− piL
L− f(ηL)− g(ηA) − ηL = 0; (32)
4ηA(ηL, ηA) = piL
L− f(ηL)− g(ηA) −
piA
g(ηA)
− ηA = 0; (33)
From the above equations, we can get:
ηL = 1− ηA − piA
g(ηA)
; (34)
By substitution (34) into (33), we can transform 4ηA(ηL, ηA) with two variables {ηL, ηA} into 4ηˆA(ηA)
which only has one variable ηA ∈ [0, 1]. We can check that ηˆA(ηA)|ηA=0 > 0 and 4ηˆA(ηA)|ηA=1 < 0. As
4ηˆA(·) is continuous on [0, 1], we can get the conclusion that 4ηˆA(ηA) = 0 has a root on the domain
of ηA. By plugging the solution of 4ηˆA(η∗A) = 0 into (34), we can get the corresponding solution of η∗L .
Hence, we can show the existence of market equilibrium. In order to proof the uniqueness, we only need
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to show that the function 4ηL(ηL, ηA) in (31) and 4ηˆA(ηA) in (34) is strictly decreasing on [0, 1]. We can
check that if
g′(ηA) ·
[
piL − piA
(L− f(ηL)− g(ηA))2 +
piA
g2(ηA)
]
≤ 1 (35)
then the first derivative of both 4ηL(ηL, ηA) and 4ηˆA(ηA) are non-positive. Moreover, we have
g′(ηA) ·
[
piL − piA
(L− f(ηL)− g(ηA))2 +
piA
g2(ηA)
]
≤ max
(
piL − piA
(L− f(ηL)− g(ηA)) ,
piA
g2(ηA)
)
· g
′(ηA)
g(ηA)
· L−B(ηL)
L− A(ηA, ηL)
(36)
Let κ = max(ηL,ηA)∈Ω{ piL−piAL−A(ηA,ηL) , piAA(ηA,ηL)−B(ηL)}, we can get the conclusion that 4ηL(ηL, ηA) in (31) and
4ηˆA(ηA) in (34) is strictly decreasing on [0, 1] when
max
(ηL,ηA)∈Ω
g′(ηA)
g(ηA)
· L−B(ηL)
L− A(ηA, ηL) ≤
1
κ
, (37)
Then we prove the convergence of market dynamics based on the contraction mapping theorem [40].
Let function h1, h2 : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be:
h1(ηL, ηA) = 1− θLA(ηL, ηA) and h2(ηL, ηA) = θLA(ηL, ηA)− θAB(ηL, ηA) (38)
Let function h : Ω→ Ω be:
h(ηL, ηA) = (h1(ηL, ηA), h2(ηL, ηA)). (39)
Then we need to show that the mapping function h(·) is a contraction on Ω with respect to the maximum
norm if the condition (11) is satisfied. Specifically, we will show that
‖h(ηL1, ηA1)− h(ηL2, ηA2)‖∞ ≤ κd‖η1 − η2‖∞ (40)
where κd = κmax(ηL,ηA)∈Ω
g′(ηA)
g(ηA)
· L−B(ηL)
L−A(ηA,ηL) , η1 = (ηL1, ηA1) ∈ Ω, η2 = (ηL2, ηA2) ∈ Ω. We assume that
η1 ≥ η2 without loss of generality.
We can check that
‖h(ηL1, ηA1)− h(ηL2, ηA2)‖∞
= max{θLA(ηL1, ηA1)− θLA(ηL2, ηA2),
θLA(ηL1, ηA1)− θLA(ηL2, ηA2) + θAB(ηL2, ηA2)− θAB(ηL1, ηA1)}
= θLA(ηL1, ηA1)− θLA(ηL2, ηA2) + θAB(ηL2, ηA2)− θAB(ηL1, ηA1)
= h2(ηL1, ηA1)− h2(ηL2, ηA2).
(41)
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Let η3 = (ηL3, ηA3), where ηA3 ∈ (ηA2, ηA1), and ηL3 ∈ (ηL2, ηL1). By mean-value theorem, we have
h2(ηL1, ηA1)− h2(ηL2, ηA2) = ∂h2
∂ηL
∣∣∣∣
ηL=ηL3,ηA=ηA3
(ηL1 − ηL2) + ∂h2
∂ηA
∣∣∣∣
ηL=ηL3,ηA=ηA3
(ηA1 − ηA2)
= − piL − piA
[L− f(1− ηL3)− g(ηA3)]2 · f
′(1− ηL3)(ηL1 − ηL2)
+
[
piL − piA
[L− f(1− ηL3)− g(ηA3)]2 · g
′(ηA3) +
piA
[g(ηA3)]2
· g′(ηA3)
]
(ηL1 − ηL2)
≤
[
piL − piA
[L− f(1− ηL3)− g(ηA3)]2 · g
′(ηA3)
+
piA
[g(ηA3)]2
· g′(ηA3)
]
·max{ηL1 − ηL2, ηL1 − ηL2}
≤ κ
[
g′(ηA3)
L− f(1− ηL3)− g(ηA3) +
g′(ηA3)
g(ηA3)
]
·max{ηL1 − ηL2, ηL1 − ηL2}
= κ · g
′(ηA3)
g(ηA3)
· L− f(1− ηL3)
L− f(1− ηL3)− g(ηA3) ·max{ηL1 − ηL2, ηL1 − ηL2}
≤ κd‖η1 − η2‖∞
(42)
D. Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. By the non-decreasing property of g(·) and the non-increasing property of f(·), we have θLB(ηL, ηA) ≤
θLB(ηL, ηA)|ηL=0 ≤ θAB(ηL, ηA)|ηA=0 ≤ θAB(ηL, ηA). By directly applying Proposition 1, we can get the
conclusion.
E. Proof for Proposition 2
Proof. If {η∗L , η∗A} is a Nash equilibrium of MSCG, then we have:
η∗L = arg max
ηL∈[0,1]
Π˜SL(I)(ηL, η
∗
A),
η∗A = arg max
ηA∈[0,1]
Π˜DB(I) (η
∗
L , ηA).
(43)
By (16), we further have: pi
∗
L(η
∗
L , η
∗
A) =(1− η∗L) · (L− f(1− η∗L)− g(η∗A)) + (1− η∗L − η∗A) · g(η∗A),
pi∗A(η
∗
L , η
∗
A) =(1− η∗L − η∗A) · g(η∗A).
(44)
Hence, we can easily check that (pi∗L , pi
∗
A), where
pi∗L = arg max
piL≥0
ΠSL(I)(piL, pi
∗
A),
pi∗A = arg max
piA≥0
ΠDB(I) (pi
∗
L , piA).
(45)
is a Nash equilibrium of PCG.
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F. Proof for Proposition 3
Proof. We first need to prove that a solution η∗L of maxηL∈[0,1] Π
SL
(I)(ηL, ηA) satisfies that η
∗
L ∈ (0, 1/2). As
ΠSL(I) is differentiable, the first-order necessary condition implies that
∂ΠSL(I)
∂ηL
∣∣∣∣
ηL=η∗L
= (1− 2η∗L) (L− f(1− η∗L)) + (1− η∗L) · η∗L · f
′
(1− η∗L)− ηA · g(ηA)− cL = 0, (46)
where f ′(x) is the first-order derivative of f(x) with respect to x. Based on the Assumption 2, we have
(1 − η∗L) · η∗L · f ′(1 − η∗L) − ηA · g(ηA) − cL < 0. Thus, (1 − 2η∗L) (L− f(1− η∗L)) > 0. According to the
Assumption 1, we further have η∗L < 1/2.
Then we need to prove that a solution η∗A of maxηA∈[0,1] Π
DB
(I) (ηL, ηA) satisfies that η
∗
A+ηL < 1, ∀ηL ∈ [0, 1].
As ΠDB(I) is differentiable, the first-order necessary condition implies that
∂ΠDB(I)
∂ηA
∣∣∣∣
ηA=η∗A
= (1−ηL−η∗A)
(
g(η∗A) + η
∗
A · g
′
(η∗A)
)
−η∗A ·g(η∗A)−cA−ηL ·δ ·g(η∗A)−ηL ·η∗A ·δ ·g
′
(η∗A) = 0, (47)
where g′(x) is the first-order derivative of g(x) with respect to x. Based on the Assumption 3, we have
−η∗A · g(η∗A) − cA − ηL · δ · g(η∗A) − ηL · η∗A · δ · g′(η∗A) < 0. Thus, (1 − ηL − η∗A)
(
g(η∗A) + η
∗
A · g′(η∗A)
)
> 0,
which implies that η∗A + ηL < 1, ∀ηL ∈ [0, 1].
G. Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. We first introduce some concepts for defining a supermodular game [14]. A real n−diensional
set V is a sublattice of Rn if for any two elements a, b ∈ V , the component-wise minimum, a ∨ b, and
the component-wise maximum, a ∧ b, are also in V . Particularly, a compact sublattice has a smallest
and largest element. A function f(x1, . . . , fN) has increasing differences in (xi, xj) for all i 6= j if
f(x1, . . . , x
1
i , . . . , xN) − f(x1, . . . , x2i , . . . , xN) is increasing in xj for all x2i − x1i > 0.20 The formal
definition of a supermodular game is given below:
Definition 6 (Supermodular Game [14]). A noncooperative game (M, {S}m∈M, {Um}m∈M) is called a
supermodular game if the following conditions are all satisfied:
• The strategy set Sm is a nonempty and compact sublattice of real number.
• The payoff function Um is supermodular in player m’s own strategy.21
• The payoff function Um has increasing differences in all sets of strategies.
We then prove that the MSCG is a supermodular game with respect to ηA and −ηL. Since the database
and the licensee competes with a single instrument η = (ηL, ηA) chosen from a compact set [0, 1]2, it
20If the function f is twice differentiable, the property is equivalent to ∂2f/∂xi∂xj ≥ 0
21A function is always supermodular in a single variable.
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suffices to show that both Π˜SL(I)(−ηL, ηA) and Π˜DB(I) (−ηL, ηA) have increasing difference in (−ηL, ηA). By
(17), we have:
∂2Π˜SL(I)(−ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)∂ηA = [g(ηA) + ηA · g
′(ηA)] · (1− δ) ≥ 0 (48)
∂2Π˜DB(I) (−ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)∂ηA = [g(ηA) + ηA · g
′(ηA)] · (1 + δ) ≥ 0 (49)
where g′(ηA) is the first-order derivative of g(·) with respect to ηA. Hence we can conclude that MSCG
is a supermodular game with respect to ηA and −ηL.
To prove the uniqueness of NE, we only need to verify that:
−∂
2Π˜SL(I)(−ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)2
≥ ∂
2Π˜SL(I)(ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)∂ηA ,
−∂
2Π˜DB(I) (−ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)2
≥ ∂
2Π˜DB(I) (ηL, ηA)
∂ηA∂(−ηL) .
(50)
The above uniqueness conditions are called dominant diagonal condition, and follow the standard super-
modular game theory. Hence, as long as Π˜SL(I)(−ηL, ηA) and Π˜DB(I) (−ηL, ηA) satisfy the above condition, we
can conclude that the MSCG has a unique NE. so does the original PCG.
H. Proof for Theorem 3
Proof. With the similar analysis used in Section V-A, we can transform the original price competiton
game (PCG) into an equivalent market share competition game (MSCG), where the payoffs function of
the licensee and the database are Π˜
SL
(II)(ηL, ηA) = (piL(ηL, ηA)− w) · ηL,
Π˜DB(II)(ηL, ηA) = piA(ηL, ηA) · ηL + w · ηL.
(51)
We first need to prove that a solution η∗L of maxηL∈[0,1] Π
SL
(II)(ηL, ηA) satisfies that η
∗
L ∈ (0, 1/2). As ΠSL(II)
is differentiable, the first-order necessary condition implies that
∂ΠSL(II)
∂ηL
∣∣∣∣
ηL=η∗L
= (1− 2η∗L) (L− f(1− η∗L)) + (1− η∗L) · η∗L · f
′
(1− η∗L)− ηA · g(ηA)− w − cL = 0, (52)
where f ′(x) is the first-order derivative of f(x) with respect to x. Based on the Assumption 2, we have
(1 − η∗L) · η∗L · f ′(1 − η∗L) − ηA · g(ηA) − w − cL < 0. Thus, (1 − 2η∗L) (L− f(1− η∗L)) > 0. According to
the Assumption 1, we further have η∗L < 1/2.
Then we need to prove that a solution η∗A of maxηA∈[0,1] Π
DB
(II)(ηL, ηA) satisfies that η
∗
A+ηL < 1, ∀ηL ∈ [0, 1].
As ΠDB(I) is differentiable, the first-order necessary condition implies that
∂ΠDB(II)
∂ηA
∣∣∣∣
ηA=η∗A
= (1− ηL − η∗A)
(
g(η∗A) + η
∗
A · g
′
(η∗A)
)
− η∗A · g(η∗A)− cA = 0, (53)
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where g′(x) is the first-order derivative of g(x) with respect to x. As −η∗A · g(η∗A)− cA < 0, we, thus, have
(1− ηL − η∗A)
(
g(η∗A) + η
∗
A · g′(η∗A)
)
> 0, which implies that η∗A + ηL < 1, ∀ηL ∈ [0, 1].
Now we only need to prove that the MSCG under WPS is a supermodular game with respect to ηA and
−ηL. Since the database and the licensee competes with a single instrument η = (ηL, ηA) chosen from a
compact set [0, 1]2, it suffices to show that both Π˜SL(I)(−ηL, ηA) and Π˜DB(I) (−ηL, ηA) have increasing difference
in (−ηL, ηA). By (51), we have:
∂2Π˜SL(II)(−ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)∂ηA = g(ηA) + ηA · g
′(ηA) ≥ 0 (54)
∂2Π˜DB(II)(−ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)∂ηA = g(ηA) + ηA · g
′(ηA) ≥ 0 (55)
where g′(ηA) is the first-order derivative of g(·) with respect to ηA. Hence we can conclude that MSCG
under WPS is a supermodular game with respect to ηA and −ηL.
To prove the uniqueness of NE, we only need to verify that:
−∂
2Π˜SL(II)(−ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)2
≥ ∂
2Π˜SL(II)(ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)∂ηA ,
−∂
2Π˜DB(II)(−ηL, ηA)
∂(−ηL)2
≥ ∂
2Π˜DB(II)(ηL, ηA)
∂ηA∂(−ηL) .
(56)
The above uniqueness conditions are called dominant diagonal condition, and follow the standard super-
modular game theory. Hence, as long as Π˜SL(II)(−ηL, ηA) and Π˜DB(II)(−ηL, ηA) satisfy the above condition, we
can conclude that the MSCG has a unique NE. so does the original PCG.
I. Best Response Iteration of Stage II
According to Appendix G, the MSCG is a supermodular game. For a supermodular game, several
commonly used updating rules are guaranteed to converged to the NE [14]. In this work, we use the
following best response algorithm as in [14]: Starting with an arbitrary market share vector η0, where 0
is the round index. At every round t, both the database and the licensee update their market share based
on their best response to its competitor’s market share in the previous round t− 1. That is,
η
(t)
L = arg max
ηL∈[0,1]
Π˜SL(I)(ηL, η
t−1
A ) (57)
η
(t)
A = arg max
ηA∈[0,1]
Π˜DB(I) (η
t−1
L , ηA) (58)
The above procedure continues until the market share equilibrium reached. Note that if both the database and
the licensee use best response algorithm update starting form their smallest (largest) element of their
strategy set, then the strategies monotonically converge to the smallest (largest) NE market share. As the
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database owns the online platform and can put its advanced service as high priority, we always assume
that the initial market share vector as η0 = {η0L = 0, η0A = 1}. Formally, we show this in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Best response update algorithm
Initialization
The licensee and the database select their own initial market share ηL(0) and ηA(0), respectively;
for each round t = 1, ..., Tend do
for the licensee and the database do
The licensee chooses the market share ηL(t) at round t according to (57), i.e., the market share maximizing his
profit under ηA(t− 1);
The database chooses the market share ηA(t) at round t according to (58), i.e., the market share maximizing his
profit under ηL(t− 1);
end
if ηL(t) == ηL(t− 1) and ηA(t) == ηA(t− 1) then break; // convergence
end
J. Energy Saving in the Integrated Market
In this subsection, we will provide additional simulation that illustrate the energy saving (when users
rely on the database to identify the best channels instead of through sensing).
For convenience, we call the market proposed in our original manuscript as the integrated market,
where the database provides both the basic service and the advanced service to users, and the licensee
leases its under-utilized channels to users. In the revised manuscript, we further consider a new benchmark
market called the sensing market, where the database only provides the basic information to user without
the advanced information (i.e., qualities of channels), and the licensee can still lease his under-utilized
channels to users via the platform of the database. In this sensing market, users choosing the unlicensed
channels provided by the database can decide to sense all the available (unlicensed) channels in order
to identify the best channel. We compare the performance of our proposed integrated market with this
benchmark sensing market in terms of the total energy cost.
More specifically, in the sensing market, we still formulate the interactions among various entities
through a three-stage hierarchical model. In Stage I, the database and the spectrum licensee negotiate the
commission charge details (regarding the spectrum market platform), i.e., the revenue sharing factor δ
under RSS, or the wholesale price w under WPS. In Stage II, the spectrum licensee determines the price
piL of the licensed channel. In Stage III, the users determine their best choices, and dynamically update
their choices based on the current market shares. The market dynamically evolves and finally reaches an
equilibrium point (if one exists).
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The analysis for the sensing market is similar to that for the integrated market in Sections IV∼VI. The
key differences are listed below. In Stage III of the sensing market, a type-θ user’s best response is22
s†θ = l, iff θL− piL > max{θS(ηtL)− cS, θB(ηtL)},
s†θ = s, iff θS(η
t
L)− cS > max{θL− piL, θB(ηtL)},
s†θ = b, iff θB(η
t
L) > max{θL− piL, θS(ηtL)− cS},
(59)
where B(ηtL) = f(1− ηtL) is the expected utility that a user can achieve when choosing the basic service
(defined in Section III of our manuscript), S(ηtL) = f(1− ηtL) + g1 is the expected utility that a user can
achieve when choosing to sense all the available channels (where g1 is a constant reflecting the additional
utility gain achieved from sensing instead of choosing the basic service), and cS is the user’s sensing cost.
We further assume that L > S(ηL) > A(ηA, ηL) > B(ηL). The reason for S(ηL) > A(ηA, ηL) > B(ηL) is
that the user can always locate the best unlicensed channel under the assumption of perfect sensing. The
reason for L > S(ηL) is that there is no mutual interference and congestion on the licensed TV channels.
In Stage II of the sensing market, the licensee determines the selling price piL for its under-utilized
channels, while the database does not make any pricing decision. The payoffs of the licensee and the
database in the sensing market under the RSS scheme (Scheme I) are Π
SL = (piL − cL)ηL(1− δ)
ΠDB = (piL − cL)ηLδ,
(60)
and their payoffs under the WPS scheme (Scheme II) are Π
SL = (piL − w)ηL − cLηL,
ΠDB = wηL.
(61)
In this sensing market, the database’s payoff comes from assisting licensee in leasing licensed channels.
Finally, in Stage I of the sensing market, we can use a similar method as in Section VI to analyze the
bargaining solution in the sensing market.
Figure 7 provides the equilibrium performance comparison between the integrated market and the
sensing market. We assume that α1 = 1, α2 = 1, β1 = 1, γ1 = 0.6, γ2 = 0.6, cA = 0.1, cL = 0.9, the
quality of leasing service L = 6, the quality of sensing service S = 2, and λ = 1.8.
Figure 7.a illustrates the energy cost achieved under different user sensing cost (cS from 0 to 0.4). In
this simulation, we compare the database’s energy cost for providing the advanced information in the
integrated market (which is calculated by ηA · cA) with the users’ energy cost for sensing channels (which
22Here, “iff” stands for “if and only if”. Note that we omit the case of θ · L− piL = max{θ · S(ηtL)− cS, θ · B(ηtL)}, θ · S(ηtL)− cS =
max{θ · L− piL, θ ·B(ηtL)}, and θ ·B(ηtL) = max{θ · L− piL, θ · S(ηtL)− cS}, which are negligible (i.e., occurring with zero probability)
due to the continuous distribution of θ.
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Fig. 7. (a) Energy cost, and (b) Social welfare vs the sensing cost of users.
is calculated by ηS · cS). Here, ηS denotes the fraction of users who choose the sensing service.23 We use
the red dash-dot line to denote the energy cost in the proposed integrated market under RSS, the red line
with circle markers to denote the energy cost in the sensing market under RSS, the blue dash-dot line
to denote the energy cost in the proposed integrated market under WPS, and the blue line with square
markers to represent the energy cost in the sensing market under WPS.
Figure 7.a shows that the proposed integrated market has a smaller energy cost than the sensing market
does under both RSS and WPS, except when the sensing cost is extremely small (i.e., cS ≤ 0.025).
The energy cost between the integrated market and the sensing market increases with the sensing cost.
As recent studies pointed out that spectrum sensing usually introduces a high operational cost [46], it
is reasonable to conclude that in practice it is more energy efficient to let the database assist users in
identifying the best channels.
Figure 7.b illustrates the social welfare (i.e., the summation of the payoffs of the licensee, the database,
and the users) achieved under different user sensing cost (cS from 0 to 0.4). In this figure, we use the
red dash-dot line to denote the social welfare in the proposed integrated market under RSS, the red line
with circle markers to denote the social welfare in the sensing market under RSS, the blue dash-dot line
to denote the social welfare in the proposed integrated market under WPS, and the blue line with square
markers to denote the social welfare in the sensing market under WPS.
Figure 7.b shows that the proposed integrated market outperforms the sensing market in terms of social
welfare. Social welfare achieved in the sensing market decreases with the sensing cost. Hence, it is more
beneficial to let the database assist users in identifying the best channels as in our integrated market.
23In the proposed integrated market, the total energy cost consists of (i) the users’ energy cost for transmission, (ii) the database’s energy
cost for providing the available channel list (basic service), computing the channel quality information (advanced information), and assisting
the licensee, and (iii) the licensee’s energy consumption cost for leasing licensed channels to users. The sensing market’s total energy cost
is similar to that of the integrated market, except that there is no database’s energy cost for providing the advanced service, and there is
an extra cost for users to perform sensing. Hence, in this simulation, we focus on the difference between the database’s energy cost for
providing the advanced information and the users’ sensing energy cost.
